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On the Security of New Key Exchange Protocols Based
on the Triple Decomposition Problem
M. M. Chowdhury
Abstract: We show that two new key exchange protocols with security
based on the triple decomposition problem may have security based on the
MSCSP.
1 Introduction
Recently a new key exchange primitive based the triple DP (decomposition
problem) is proposed in [1] and the triple DP is defined in [1] as finding the
decomposition of a given element into three elements (that are not known).
One purpose of inventing the above scheme of [1] is its security is based on
hard problems in braid groups such that a linear algebraic attack is not possible.
It is claimed in [1] that the security of the new scheme is based on the triple
DP in any G. If G is a group / the private keys are invertible then we show
that the scheme in [1] is based on the CSP (conjugacy search problem) or the
MSCSP (multiple simultaneous CSP) hence the algorithms in [1] are no more
secure than using other key agreement algorithms using the CSP or MSCSP
and hence the new scheme in [1] can be attacked feasibly using linear algebra
if using braid groups (or the new scheme can be attacked with any algorithm
that gives solutions of the CSP or MSCSP). There is a linear algebraic method
to find solutions of the MSCSP which has been used to attack the braid key
exchange protocol of Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld [2] and this attack can be used to
attack the new scheme with linear algebra.
2 Description of the New Protocols Based on the Triple Decom-
position Problem
In this section the protocols are described using original portions of sections
2 and 3 taken from the preprint [1] (hence the protocols are described as exactly
as in [1]).
2.1 Suggested Subgroup Parameters
In this section the protocols are described using original portions of sections
5 taken from the preprint [1] (hence the parameters are described as exactly as
in [1]).
3 Security Of the Protocols based on the Triple Decomposition
Problem
If G is a group (it is suggested in [1] that G may be a group an example
given in [1] for G is the braid group) or the private keys are invertible then we
can show the following. In this section we give our new result that the security
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of the new protocols in [1] is based on a system of equations (1 & 2 below),
MSCSP or the CSP in G.
3.1 The First Protocol
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For some integer K1 and JI (JI may be braids) chosen by the attacker.
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For some integer K2 and TI chosen by the attacker. Observe the elements
JI are chosen from the A3 (because of the commutativity conditions of the
protocols) and the elements TI are chosen from A2. To find b2 compute b2 =
b−1
1
O1b
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and now Bob’s private key is known and so the secret shared key can
be constructed. Hence from the systems of equations 1 and 2 the security of the
protocol can be based on the MSCSP [3] (which includes the CSP) hence we
have shown that the security of the new protocol in [1] is based on solving the
MSCSP twice. A very similar derivation show the security of the new protocol
is also based on two MSCSP with the unknowns a1 and a3. An observation
from the above is for any G the above the security of the protocol can also
be based on (MSDSP) multiple simultaneous decomposition search problem
for example (using the above computations) by solving the equations b1b2JIb3
for b3, b1TIb2b3 for b1 and then solving for b2 using b1 and b3 and using the
publicly known information (again there is a similar result using Alice’s private
keys) and not the triple decomposition problem. Observe that for the possible
specific parameters suggested in [1] satisfy commutativity conditions such as B2
commutes with A2 etc. in addition to the required commutativity conditions
which are necessary for the protocol to work. We can use these above additional
commutativity conditions to show the security can be based on the CSP as
follows. We can solve MSCSP for a1and b3 as described as above. Let O2 =
uvw = a1a2a3.
To recover the common secret key compute
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we can solve for above a3, b1 by solving the CSP with b1b2, a2a3 Or we can solve
the 5,6 below for b1 and a3 as follows (so again the protocol can be based on
the MSCSP).
Attacker selects VI commuting with a2 but not with a3 or select VI ∈ B1
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similarly the attacker selects WI commuting with b2 but not with b1 or select
VI ∈ A3
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The above result also holds when different subgroups are used that satisfy the
additional commutativity conditions (described above) for an arbitrary G.
Observe that computing b1 and b3 from the MSCSP or CSP gives
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3
, hence b2 = (b
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3
) (a2 can be computed in a
very similar way).
To defend against the attack in section 3.1 of reconstructing the secret shared
key by solving the MSCSP the private keys of Alice, Bob are chosen so that they
not invertible.
3.2 The Second Protocol
The derivation to show the second protocol can be based on the MSCSP
is identical to the derivation for the first protocol except the elements JI are
chosen from Sy2 , the elements TI are chosen from Sy1 etc. hence the above
observations also applies to the second protocol. To defend against the attack
in section 3.1 of reconstructing the secret shared key by solving the MSCSP all
the elements in the private keys of Alice, Bob are chosen so that they are all
not invertible.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that two new key exchange protocols with security based on
the triple decomposition problem may have security based on the MSCSP or
the MSDSP.
References
[1] A New Key Exchange Primitive Based on the Triple Decomposition Prob-
lem, Yesem Kurt, Cryptology eprint archive,http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/378
[2] A Linear Algebraic Attack on the AAFG1 Braid Group Cryptosystem,
7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy-2002, LNCS
2384, Springer Verlag, pp. 176-189, 2002
[3] Ki Hyoung Ko, Tutorial on Braid Cryptosystems 3, PKC 2001,www.ipkc.org/pre conf/pkc2001/PKCtp ko.ps
[19] A New Key Exchange Protocol Based on the Decomposition Problem,
V. Shilparin and A. Ushakov, http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/447
6
Appendix
We sketch the proof for the attacks considering the suggestion of 5.2.2 in [1].
We recover Bob’s private key as follows.
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Hence b3 can be found by solving the MSCSP.
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Now select JI form A2.
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Hence b1 can be found by solving the MSCSP.
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Then we can recover Bob’s second private key as
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Now we have Bob’s private key, the shared key is recovered as
a1(s1x1s
−1
1
)(s1b1s
−1
1
)(s1x
−1
1
s−1
1
)(s2a2s
−1
2
)(s3x2s
−1
3
)(s3b2s
−1
3
)(s3x
−1
2
s−1
3
)
(s4a3s
−1
4
)b3 =
a1(s1x1b1x
−1
1
s−1
1
)(s2a2s
−1
2
)(s3x2b2x
−1
2
s−1
3
)(s4a3s
−1
4
)b3 = shared key
There are similar attacks for each of our above attacks.
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